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Abstract
We consider an environment where the sale can take place so early that both the seller and
the potential buyers have the same uncertainty about the quality of the good. We present a
simple model that allows the seller to put the good for sale before or after this uncertainty is
resolved, , namely via forward auction or spot auction, respectively. We solve for the equilibrium
of these two auctions and then compare the resulting revenues. We also consider the revenue
implications of the insurance in forward auctions.
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1 Introduction
It is quite often the case that the sellers and the buyers transact when there are uncertainties about
the quality of the object. Examples could be drawn from a wide range of industries. In Australia,
real estates are occasionally sold o¤ the plan using auctions. In many countries, agricultural
produce is often sold long before the harvest. Moreover, as a wide practice in Japanese racehorse
industry, the foals are sold before they are born. Similarly, in many countries, including Australia,
Canada, and the United States, livestock breeders sell embryos in auctions. In the UK gas industry,
National Grid, the network owner that is in charge of balancing the demand and the supply of gas
in the network, auctions o¤ the transmission capacity rights - right to insert gas into the network
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- well in advance of the realization of the demand for gas, that is, before observing the availability
of the capacity (See McDaniel and Neuho¤ (2004)).1
These examples share three salient features: One, the seller uses an auction as a selling mech-
anism, two, the sale takes place so early that both the seller and the potential buyers have the
same uncertainty (symmetric uncertainty) about the quality of the object, and, three, this uncer-
tainty is resolved simultaneously for the seller and the buyers. While there is a line of literature on
transactions under asymmetric uncertainty (for instance, see Lewis (2007) and Kogan and Morgan
(2009)), to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any theoretical work on auctions with
symmetric uncertainty.2 This paper is a rst attempt toward lling this gap.
The uncertainty present in the aforementioned examples can be captured by considering two
states of the world: good state (or good quality) and the bad state (or bad quality). Both sides
of the transaction anticipate that the object would create full value to its owner in the good state
whereas only a fraction of it in the bad state. In extreme cases, the object would yield no value in
the bad state (e.g. gas transmission and embryo auctions).
Along this line, we present a simple model in which the seller could sell the object either
before the uncertainty is resolved, i.e. via forward auction or after, i.e. via spot auction. While
in the former case, the terms of sale (i.e. regarding the winning bidder and winning price) are
pre-committed before the ex-post values are privately observed by the bidders, in the latter case,
the terms are xed after the ex-post values are privately observed, as is usually assumed in auction
theory literature.
We consider a symmetric environment with independent and private values. In this setup,
symmetric and strictly increasing equilibrium bidding strategies yield the same e¢ cient allocation
in forward auction and spot auction. Therefore, if both the seller and the buyers are risk neutral,
revenue equivalence principle applies, implying that the forward and spot auctions generate the
same revenue. Coexistence of both types of auctions in real world, however, suggests that they
could yield di¤erent revenues.
1Note that, in almost all of these industries, the goods are also sold after the uncertainty is resolved. For example,
sale of transmission capacities also occur when there are extra capacities left after the demand is realized. Livestock
and race horses are also sold after they are born.
2 In an experimental paper Phillips, Menkhaus and Krogmeier (2001) test behavior in forward and spot double
auctions. Their focus, however, is on the implications of inventory costs due to advance production and not on the
quality uncertainty.
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According to many studies buyerspreferences can exhibit risk aversion and/or loss aversion.34
In this paper, we demonstrate that these preferences could account for the revenue di¤erences
between the forward and the spot auctions. The class of utility functions we consider (i) shows risk
aversion and loss aversion properties, (ii) produces closed form equilibrium bidding strategies, and
(iii) boils down to risk-neurality for some parameter specications.
In forward auctions, the price the winner commits to pay could exceed the ex-post value of the
object to him, yielding a negative payo¤. The seller could, therefore, naturally consider insuring
the winner against such risk. For instance, National Grid guarantees to buy back certain capacity
rights, if the capacity ends up being unavailable. In embryo auctions, some sellers guarantee
pregnancy. To shed some light on these observations, we also look at the revenue implications of
the insurance (in the form of buy-back guarantee) in forward auctions.
In majority of the examples mentioned above, auctions typically use a second price rule. We
hence consider auctions of the form of second-price sealed bid auction. We solve for the equilib-
rium of three auction formats: spot auction, forward auction, and forward auction with insurance.
We then compare the resulting revenues. First, we characterize a condition which determines when
a forward auction results in higher revenues than a spot auction. It turns out that forward auction
becomes less favorable to the seller if buyers are more loss averse. Next, we show that (under a
mild convexity assumption) the spot auction generates higher expected revenue than the forward
auction with insurance.5 The result follows because, while the insurance induces buyers to bid more
aggressively (relative to the expected bid in spot auction), it also results in ine¢ ciencies as the seller
sometimes keeps the object. It turns out that the loss of revenue due to ine¢ ciency dominates the
gain from aggressive bidding. Lastly, we compare expected revenues of forward auction with and
without insurance. We nd that there is no general revenue ranking between the two. Without
insurance bidders might be very cautious about their bids in a forward auction. If that is the case,
3Seminal works on loss aversion are due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
Primary contributions on risk aversion in auctions are due to Maskin and Riley (1984) and Matthews (1987).
4 If the buyers are risk neutral and seller is risk averse, one can easily argue that expected utility of the seller by
selling via forward auction would be greater than that from spot auction.
5To the extent that this model captures the main aspects of the motivating examples, provision of full insurance
in forward auctions is optimal only if the seller does not choose to use a spot auction for reasons not included in our
model. This result conforms with practice, as full insurance is provided by the seller only in auctions for transmission
capacity rights and in embryo auctions. In these two industries, forward auctions are preferred over spot auctions
for the need for balancing the network in a timely fashion and the need for faster reproduction of livestock. In other
three industries, insurance is typically provided not by the seller, but by third parties.
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then a forward auction with insurance can be better for the seller than a forward auction.
2 Model
Consider a seller who would like to sell an object (foal), the quality of which is commonly unknown
in period 1 (unborn foal), but becomes common knowledge in period 2 (after birth). The quality
can take two forms: good with probability p and bad with probability (1  p) :
There are n bidders with the utility function,
u (x) =
8><>: x
 if x  0
  ( x) if x < 0;
(1)
where  2 (0; 1] is the risk aversion parameter and   1 is the loss aversion parameter. Note that,
this utility specication allows for risk aversion and loss aversion. The limit cases of interest are
(i)  = 1;  = 1; which corresponds to risk neutrality,
(ii)  = 1;  > 1; which corresponds to loss aversion via kinked linear functions, and
(ii)  = 1;  2 (0; 1) which corresponds to constant relative risk aversion on the positive axis
with no loss aversion.
Sellers value for the object is normalized to be zero. The bidders independently draw their
private valuations from a atomless cumulative distribution F on [0; 1] with f () = F 0 () > 0. If
the object turns out to be of good quality, then it will create the full value, x; to its buyer. On the
other hand, if it is of bad quality, then it will create a fraction of the full value, kx; where k 2 [0; 1):
For the unborn foal example, x represents the value associated with the ability of the buyer to train
the horse, whereas quality (1 versus k < 1) could represent the inherited quality of the foal.
The seller can sell the object either before the quality is realized (forward auction) or after (spot
auction). In either case, he adapts the second-price sealed bid auction. The highest bidder gets to
keep the object irrespective of the quality and pays the second highest bid.
When using a forward auction, the seller could also o¤er insurance in the form of "buy-back
guarantee" as the winners ex-post value for the object could exceed the price he pays (if the quality
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turns out to be bad), a risk that would hinder aggressive bidding. The buy-back guarantee would
allow the winner to default on buying the object. Note that, in spot auction, no such insurance is
needed as the price paid in equilibrium would always be smaller than the ex-post value.
In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we analyze spot auction, forward auction, and forward auction with
insurance, respectively. We then compare the respective revenues in Section 6 and conclude in
Section 7.
3 Spot auction
In a spot auction, in both contingencies (good quality or bad quality), bidders bid their values in
(weakly dominant) equilibrium, therefore sellers expected revenue is given by
(p+ (1  p) k)E
h
Y
(n)
2
i
(2)
where Y (n)2 is the random variable representing the second highest of n independent and identical
draws from distribution F .
4 Forward auction
Here we consider a seller who uses a forward auction but does not o¤er any insurance. Then, the
expected utility of a bidder with value x who bids as if his value is z is given by
G (z)E

pu
 
x  F (y)+ (1  p)u  kx  F (y) j y < z
=
Z z
0
 
pu
 
x  F (y)+ (1  p)u  kx  F (y) g (y) dy
where G (z) = F (z)n 1 represents the distribution of the highest value of the remaining n   1
bidders, i.e. Y (n 1)1 ; g (z) = G
0 (z) represents the corresponding density, and F () is the symmetric
strategy they follow. Di¤erentiating with respect to z and evaluating at z = x gives the following
necessary rst order condition:
 
pu
 
x  F (x)+ (1  p)u  kx  F (x) g (x) = 0
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Since g (x) > 0, it follows that
pu
 
x  F (x)+ (1  p)u  kx  F (x) = 0:
For this to be true, we should have
x  F (x)  kx:
Since u is assumed to be of the form in (1), we obtain
p
 
x  F (x) = (1  p)   F (x)  kx ;
or
x  F (x)
F (x)  kx =

 (1  p)
p
 1

 t:
Rearranging this expression gives us the following equilibrium bidding strategy,
F (x) =
1 + tk
1 + t
x
or
F (x) =

1
1 + t
+
t
1 + t
k

x:
Note that, this satises x  F (x)  kx.6
We see that, in equilibrium, bidders calculate a weighted average of the qualities and bid
proportional to this weighted average. For example, when bidders are risk neutral, namely when
 =  = 1, the weights attached to respective qualities correspond to bidderspriors p and (1  p),
implying that the risk neutral bidders would bid their expected valuations (i.e. (p+ (1  p) k)x)
in a forward auction. Yet, in general, depending on the parameter values, bidders might bid more
or less than their expected valuations. We elaborate on this below when comparing the forward
and spot auction revenues.
6Note that we obtain the equilibrium bidding strategy by using only the necessary condition. It can be con-
rmed that for this strategy, global deviations are not protable and F () constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
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For above equilibrium, the sellers expected revenue is given by
1 + tk
1 + t
E
h
Y
(n)
2
i
: (3)
5 Forward auction with insurance
We showed in the previous section that, in equilibrium, the winner in a forward auction could end
up with a negative payo¤, which hinders aggressive bidding. To induce more aggressive bidding,
the seller could o¤er an insurance. Here, we consider the insurance in the form of a buy-back
guarantee: the seller guarantees to buy-back the object at the selling price if the winner demands
so.
Consider a bidder with value x who pretends as if his value is z; then his expected payo¤ is
given by
G (z)E

pu
 
x  FI (y)+ (1  p)maxfu  kx  FI (y) ; 0g j y < z
=
Z z
0
 
pu
 
x  FI (y)+ (1  p)maxfu  kx  FI (y) ; 0g g (y) dy;
where G (z) = F (z)n 1, g (z) = G0 (z) ; and FI () is the symmetric strategy that the remaining
bidders follow: Di¤erentiating with respect to z and evaluating at z = x; yields the following rst
order condition,
 
pu
 
x  FI (x)+ (1  p)maxfu  kx  FI (x) ; 0g g (x) = 0:
Since g () > 0; it follows that
pu
 
x  FI (x)+ (1  p)maxfu  kx  FI (x) ; 0g = 0:
Hence, we should have
FI (x) = x:
That is , the buyers bid truthfully. Note that, this equilibrium holds for any utility specication
(with u (0) = 0). Note also that, in equilibrium, the seller buys the object back with positive
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probability. Hence, with a buy-back guarantee, the outcome of the forward auction is not fully
e¢ cient, whereas the standard forward auction and the spot auction are both e¢ cient.
Sellers expected revenue from the forward auction with insurance is then given by
p
Z 1
0
Z x1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1 + (1  p)
Z 1
0
Z kx1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1 (4)
where x1 represents highest order statistic and x2 represent second highest order statistic of n
random draws and f1;2 (x1; x2) is the corresponding joint density. Note that, in equilibrium, the
winner pays the second highest value whenever he keeps the object, and he does so unless the
quality is bad and the price exceeds his expost value for the bad quality object, kx1; hence the
upper bound of the second integral in the second term.
6 Comparison of revenues in di¤erent auction formats
6.1 Spot auction versus forward auction
Proposition 1 Expected revenue of forward auction is greater than that of spot auction if and only
if
p >

1
1 
1 + 
1
1 
:
Proof. From (3) and (2), expected revenue in a forward auction is greater than that of spot
auctions when
1
1 + t
+
t
1 + t
k > p+ (1  p) k
where
t =

 (1  p)
p
 1

:
Rearranging, we obtain
1  p
p
>

 (1  p)
p
 1

which is true when p > 
1
1 
1+
1
1 
:
That is, forward auction is better if and only if the probability of the object being good is greater
than the amount 
1
1 
1+
1
1 
. Note that, this condition is independent of k; the quality measure of
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the bad object. This follows from the fact that, in forward auction bidders bid according to some
weighted average of the two qualities (1 and k) and, in spot auction, ex-ante average bid is also a
weighted average of these qualities.7 While the weight attached to the good quality is 11+t in the
former, it is p in the latter. Thus, which average would be greater depends only on the attached
weights, but not the qualities.
Note also that, 
1
1 
1+
1
1 
is increasing in : This implies that the equilibrium bid in forward
auction decreases with the degree of loss aversion (), therefore forward auction becomes less
favorable to the seller the more loss averse the bidders.
Remark 1 If  = 1; the forward auction is better than the spot auction i¤ p > 12 : If  = 1; and
 > 1; that is, if the utilities are loss averse via kinked linear functions, then it turns out that the
spot auction is always better than the forward auction. If  =  = 1; that is, if the bidders are risk
neutral, then the spot and the forward auctions are revenue equivalent. This equivalence could also
be obtained by the revenue equivalence principle as both auctions result in e¢ cient allocations.
6.2 Spot auction versus forward auction with insurance
Remember that, in the spot auction and in the forward auction with insurance, bidders bid their
true valuations and that the corresponding expected revenues are given by (2) and (4). We obtain
the following revenue ranking.
Proposition 2 Under a mild convexity assumptionthe assumption that xf (x) is increasingthe
expected revenue from the spot auction is greater than that from the forward auction with insurance.
Proof. The di¤erence in the two revenues is given by
(p+ k (1  p))E
h
Y
(n)
2
i
 

pE
h
Y
(n)
2
i
+ (1  p)
Z 1
0
Z kx1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1

= (1  p)

kE
h
Y
(n)
2
i
 
Z 1
0
Z kx1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1

= (1  p)

k
Z 1
0
Z x1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1  
Z 1
0
Z kx1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1

7Ex-ante average bid in a spot auction is the same as the equilibrium bid in a forward auction with risk neutral
bidders. Thus, in forward auction, the behavior of a risk neutral bidder can be compared to the non risk neutral loss
averse bidders along the same lines.
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Dene A (k) = k
R 1
0
R x1
0 x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1  
R 1
0
R kx1
0 x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1 and note that
A (0) = A (1) = 0: Di¤erentiate A (k) once to obtain
A0 (k) =
Z 1
0
Z x1
0
x2f1;2 (x1; x2) dx2dx1  
Z 1
0
x1kx1f1;2 (x1; kx1) dx1;
and by di¤erentiating twice we get
A00 (k) =  
Z 1
0
(x1)
2 f1;2 (x1; kx1) + k (x1)
3 @
@x2
f1;2 (x1; kx1) dx1:
Since the valuations are independent, we have
f1;2 (x1; x2) = n (n  1) f (x1) f (x2)F (x2)n 2
and
@
@x2
f1;2 (x1; x2) = n (n  1) f (x1)
h
f 0 (x2)F (x2)n 2 + (f (x2))2 (n  2)F (x2)n 3
i
= n (n  1) f (x1) f (x2)F (x2)n 2

f 0 (x2)
f (x2)
+
f (x2)
F (x2)
(n  2)

:
Therefore, we obtain
A00 (k) =  
Z 1
0
(x1)
2

f1;2 (x1; kx1) + kx1
@
@x2
f1;2 (x1; kx1)

dx1
=  
Z 1
0
(x1)
2 n (n  1) f (x1) f (kx1)F (kx1)n 2

1 + kx1

f 0 (kx1)
f (kx1)
+
f (kx1)
F (kx1)
(n  2)

dx1:
Note that, (x1)
2 n (n  1) f (x1) f (kx1)F (kx1)n 2 is positive for all k and x1: Moreover,
1 + kx1

f 0 (kx1)
f (kx1)
+
f (kx1)
F (kx1)
(n  2)

 1 + kx1 f
0 (kx1)
f (kx1)
and 1+kx1
f 0(kx1)
f(kx1)
is greater than zero for the distributions that satisfy (f (x)x)0 = f 0 (x)x+f (x) 
0:
Since A (k) is zero at k = 0 and k = 1 and concave in between, we conclude that A (k)  0 for
all k:
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Note that, all convex distributions and all power distributions (whether convex or concave)
satisfy the above mentioned mild-convexity assumption. The intuition behind the result is the
following. When the quality of the object is good, both spot auction and forward auction with
insurance obtain the same revenue. When the quality is bad, however, spot auction always obtains
an ex-post revenue of kY (n)2 ; whereas forward auction with insurance obtains ex-post revenue of
either Y (n)2 or 0: When the value distribution becomes su¢ ciently convex, the revenue becomes
more likely to be 0: Therefore spot auction obtains a higher expected revenue.
6.3 Forward auction versus forward auction with insurance
Lastly, we compare expected revenues of forward auctions with and without insurance.
Proposition 3 There is no general revenue ranking between forward auction and forward auctions
with insurance.
Proof. The expected revenue from forward auctions with insurance is given by (4). For uniform
value distributions, F (x) = x; f1;2 (x1; x2) = n (n  1) (x2)n 2 and (4) simplies to (p+ (1  p) kn)E
h
Y
(n)
2
i
:
Therefore, for uniform distributions, expected revenue from forward auction is greater than that
with full insurance if
1 + tk
1 + t
> p+ (1  p) kn
1 +

(1 p)
p
 1

k
1 +

(1 p)
p
 1

> p+ (1  p) kn
we conclude that there is no unambiguous ranking: Even for the two extreme cases, namely for
 = 1; and for  = 1; we nd two sets of parameter values that show either auction format can be
better.
For  = 1, {n = 2; p = 12 ; k =
1
2 ;  = 2} gives 0:67 versus 0:625 (left hand side versus right
hand side) and {n = 2; p = 12 ; k =
1
2 ;  = 4} gives us 0:6 versus 0:625: Other one is for  = 1;
{n = 2; p = 13 ,  =
1
2 , k = 0:1} gives 0:28 versus 0:34 and {n = 2; p =
1
3 ,  =
1
2 , k = 0:4} gives
0:52 versus 0:44:
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Remark 2 When buyers are risk neutral, i.e.  =  = 1; (with the convexity assumption), both
the forward and the spot auctions are revenue superior to the forward auctions with insurance.
With insurance (of the form buy-back guarantee), it might seem that the seller would be worse
o¤ as he is o¤ering insurance for free. But it is not quite the case, as without this insurance bidders
might be very cautious for their bids. That is why, for some parameter values, providing insurance
in a forward auction is preferable for the seller.
7 Conclusion
We observe wide use of forward transactions (auctions-markets-contracts) in real world, yet theo-
retical analysis of forward auctions is virtually missing. Emergence of forward auctions might stem
from di¤erent reasons such as credit constraints, risk hedging, or scheduling purposes. We provide
an alternative explanation in the absence of these possible reasons, namely the revenue implications
of buyersrisk attitudes. We present a simple model with risk (and loss) averse buyers and compare
the equilibria of forward versus spot auctions on the basis of expected revenue. We also consider
the revenue e¤ects of the insurance provided by the seller. We observe that either of the spot or the
forward auction can be revenue superior to the other. Interestingly, this superiority is independent
of the quality of the bad object.We also observed that spot auction is always revenue superior to
forward auction with insurance, whereas forward auctions with insurance can be revenue superior
to forward auctions.
Extension of our work to the multi-unit setting is the next natural step. Forward auctions
for transmission capacity rights, for instance, would more naturally be modelled as a multi-unit
auction where buyers have multi-unit demand. In a multi-unit setting, one would also be interested
in seeing how the seller endogenously determines the number of units she sells in a forward auction.
Insights from multi-unit forward auctions would also help us better understand forward markets in
general.
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